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RECENT CONSUMER PROTECTION
DEVELOPMENTS IN MONTANA
Christopher B. Swartley
I. INTRODUCTION
The consumer protection movement has been receiving in-
creased attention recently from the federal government. Few Mon-
tanans are aware that many of the federal developments in con-
sumer law vitally affect this state's citizens, and that in addition,
Montana has made steady progress on its own in the consumer law
area. This note will discuss these advances by means of an overview
of key provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (recently
amended)' and court interpretations of them, and their relationship
to the Montana Consumer Protection Act' and administrative ac-
tion pursuant to it. Lawyers who are concerned with consumer prob-
lems should also be aware that there have been other recent devel-
opments which are relevant to Montana but beyond the limited
scope of this work.3
1I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
A. Historical Background
The FTC was created in 1914 as a result of enforcement difficul-
ties under the Sherman Antitrust Act,4 and the enunciation of un-
certain standards by the Supreme Court in regard to monopoliza-
tion.5 Section 5 of the original FTC Act' empowered the Commission
to prevent "unfair methods of competition in commerce" by cease
and desist orders. However, it was not until passage of the Wheeler-
Lea Amendment' to the FTC Act that consumers received substan-
1. 15 U.S.C. 39 41 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) [hereinafter referred
to as the FTC Act].
2. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter referred to as R.C.M. 1947], §§ 85-
401 et seq. [hereinafter referred to as the Montana Act].
3. See, for example, the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et
seq. (Supp. IV, 1974); the Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. (Supp.
IV, 1974); and Montana's Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 18-501 et seq.,
enacted in 1975. The creation of a federal Consumer Protection Agency (or Agency for Con-
sumer Advocacy) continues to draw Congressional attention, but House-Senate agreement
and passage of a bill are elusive. A discussion of the history of this legislation can be found
in Leighteon, The Consumer Advocacy Agency Proposal . . . Again, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 149
(1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. 39 1 et seq. (1970).
5. See historical discussion in MacIntyre and Volhard, The FTC and Incipient
Unfairness, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 409-411 (1973).
6. FTC Act § 5, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp.
IV, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as § 5].
7. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
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tial benefit from the Commission. Prior to 1938, experimental con-
sumer fraud prosecutions had been severely hampered by reviewing
courts' strict construction of the term "unfair methods of compe-
tion" to require not only proof of injury to the consumer, but also
proof of injury to competition among businesses.' The 1938 Amend-
ment clarified the FTC's function by adding to § 5 the declaration
that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" were un-
lawful.'
The Wheeler-Lea Amendments represented a shift in emphasis,
from the control of deceptive... practices as an incident of anti-
trust regulation to the avowed purpose of protecting the consumer
from fraud.'"
The FTC is now recognized as possessing dual powers: first,
.to define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit
of the antitrust laws. . .;" and second, ". . .to proscribe practices
as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of
their nature or quality as competitive practices or their effect on
competition."" Pursuant to this latter function, the FTC has cre-
ated an extensive federal jurisprudence to give meaning to the post-
1938 § 5, thus establishing a substantial body of federal consumer
protection law. In addition to the hundreds of reported decisions
generally defining "unfair or deceptive" there are "trade regulation
rules" officially promulgated and directed to specific problem situa-
tions between consumers and industry."
B. The FTC Consumer Law
The methods by which the FTC chooses to exercise its powers
and the outcome of such actions have dual relevance to Montana
consumers. First is the direct effect that a Trade Regulation Rule
or successful FTC prosecution has on purveyors within its jurisdic-
tion "in or affecting commerce.' 3 Most gasoline refiners and dis-
8. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 728-9
(1972).
9. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
10. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 994, citing H.R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th
Cong., Ist Sess. at 3 (1937): ". . .this amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured
by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufac-
turer injured..."
11. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
12. 16 CFR §§ 400 et seq., dealing with topics as diverse as sleeping bag content,
cigarette package warnings, and posting of octane ratings.
13. P.L. 93-637, § 201 (Jan. 4, 1975) amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(2)(1). The amendment
changed the words "in commerce" to "in or affecting commerce" throughout the entire FTC
A ct.
[Vol. 37
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tributors who sell automotive gas "in commerce", for example, are
bound by the octane posting requirement of 16 CFR § 422;"4 failure
to comply could result in a cease and desist action"5 or a civil action
by the Commission for consumer relief." Secondly, Montana's con-
sumer statute gives great weight to federal action under § 5 by
making FTC and court interpretations of it part of our substantive
law." It is therefore essential that prosecuting attorneys and con-
sumer advocates be aware of some of the major developments under
the FTC Act.
1. The Decision Whether to Prosecute or Make Rules
Even before the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, the federal
courts had rejected common law limitations to the FTC's prosecu-
tion power:
The commissioners. . .are to exercise their common sense, as in-
formed by their knowledge of the general idea of unfair trade at
common law, and stop all those trade practices that have a capac-
ity or a tendency to injure competitors directly or through decep-
tion of purchasers, quite irrespective of whether the specific prac-
tices in question have yet been denounced in common law cases."8
The open-ended nature of the original § 5 and the breadth added
by the 1938 Amendment indicated an intent to allow for a con-
stantly expanding body of law.
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
[FTC] does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring
14. The Rule makes it an unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive act
or practice to fail to disclose minimum octane of gasoline dispensed in commerce. This Rule
is especially noteworthy because of the treatment it received in National Petroleum Refiners
Association v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 951 (1974). J. Skelly
Wright confirmed the power claimed by the FTC to promulgate substantive rules of illegality
in business conduct ("Trade Regulation Rules"), in advance of specific adjudications, under
15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b(a) and (b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
17. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-403 states:
(1) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing section 2 [85-402: Unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce are unlawful]... due consideration and weight shall be
given to the interpretations of the federal trade commission and the federal courts
relating to section 5(a)(1) of the [FTC Act]; and
(2) The [Department of Business Regulation] may make rules and regulations
interpreting the provisions of section 2... of this act. Such rules and regulations
shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the federal
trade commission and the federal courts in interpreting... section 5(a)(1) of the
[FTC Act].
18. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919). For a treatment of
the common law of unfair competition see 1 H. NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TanEM aKS,
ch. 1 (4th ed. 1947). 3
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a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated stan-
dard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the
spirit of the antitrust laws. 9
What standards will the FTC use to capture this elusive con-
cept? At least an indication can be gleaned from past administra-
tive action:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in deter-
mining whether a practice that is neither in violation of the anti-
trust laws nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair:
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it
has been established by statutes, the common law, or other-
wise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the pen-
umbra of some common law, statutory, or other established
concept of unfairness, (2) whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial
injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)." ' 0
This statement may be as elusive as the concept of unfairness;
perhaps for that reason it was quoted but not followed in a recent
case, where a new and broader balancing test was set forth:
An unfairness analysis will take into account many basic economic
facts and considerations, and will permit a broad focus in the
examination of marketing practices. Unfairness is potentially a
dynamic analytical tool capable of a progressive, evolving applica-
tion which can keep pace with a rapidly changing economy. Thus
as consumers products and marketing practices change in number,
complexity, variety, and function, standard of fairness to the con-
sumer may also change.2'
Perhaps the flexibility of such "tests" is valuable in allowing
the FTC elbowroom under § 5. Some commentators maintain, how-
ever, that the uncertainty of such standards makes them unworka-
ble and retard development by administrators and courts.2 As an
additional guideline, a proposed standard has been suggested which
is based upon a combination of § 5 itself and the two tests set out
above:
19. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., supra note 11 at 244 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at n.5, citing Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408,
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964).
21. Pfizer Inc., 81 FTC 23, 61 (1972)(footnote omitted).
22. Erxleben, The FTC's Kaleidoscopic Unfairness Statute: Section 5, 10 GONZAGA L.
REv. 333, 342 (1975). The author is the Seattle Regional Director of the FTC; the views he
expressed are his own.
[Vol. 37
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(1) the conduct causes substantial injury or the threat of sub-
stantial injury to consumers.
(2) the conduct offends a communal standard of fair dealing
evidenced, directly or indirectly, by an established concept of pub-
lic policy or values.
(3) the conduct results in net social or economic disutility. In an
unfairness analysis the need for any one of these factors is, of
course, influenced by the degree of presence of the other two.
Where one is clearly present, and the business justification is rela-
tively small, the practice is likely to be proscribed.2?
2. The Choice of How to Proceed-Court Guidelines to § 5
Prosecutions
Several fundamental rules have been enunciated by the federal
courts as guidelines for all FTC prosecutions. Additional rules have
been laid out for the many different fact situations that occur. A
basic familiarity with these principles is necessary to understand
the power of the FTC.
The most important principle involved in establishing a § 5
cause of action is "that a finding of 'tendency and capacity to mis-
lead' is sufficient and that actual deception need not be shown. ' '2 4
Thus it is not necessary for the Commission to produce consumers
to testify to deception, nor are consumers needed to testify to the
meaning they perceived in a representation.25 Furthermore, both
intent 5 and good faith27 are irrelevant. To prove a case of deception,
the FTC must show by substantial evidence:
1. That the product or service is not as effective as claimed and
as understood by the hypothetical consumer,
2. That the product's performance is different from the claim, or
3. That the claim cannot be verified.28
It is logical to assume that rules similar to those applied in cases
involving deception would be applicable to those involving unfair-
ness in another manifestation. As a practical matter, it appears that
23. Id. at 342-3. (footnotes omitted). These criteria are offered strictly for the reader's
analytical use and as an indication of the direction the FTC may take in the future. They
may also be helpful to prosecuting attorneys for the purpose of evaluating a potential case.
24. Vacu-matic Carburetor Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 806 (1946).
25. Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). A
capacity to deceive can be inferred solely from exhibits without additional proof. Portwood
v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419, 422 (10th Cir. 1969).
26. FTC v. Algonia Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
27. Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953).
28. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal Trade Commission, 17
KAN. L. REV. 559, 563 (1969).
19761
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most FTC allegations incorporate the two concepts without distinc-
tion.2
To whom must a practice be unfair or deceptive under § 5? The
standard of the "reasonable consumer" has been definitively re-
jected:
[The FTC Act] was not "made for the protection of experts, but
for the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant,
the unthinking and the credulous" . . .; and the "fact that a false
statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and
experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power
to deceive others less experienced" . . . the Commission may ins-
ist upon the most literal truthfulness ... 0
Another fundamental principle is that consumer protection
should be preventative, reaching a suspected wrong before it be-
comes too widespread or well-developed. Although it lacks prelimi-
nary injunctive powers and thus cannot actually prevent actions
until after trial and administrative appeals,3 the Commission has
the power to act on an alleged § 5 violation in its "incipiency":
[Tihe Commission should have the power to restrain an unfair act
before it [becomes] a method or practice, if, in its discretion, such
restraint be in the public interest. A single act may have multiple
effects and may be far reaching. . .In fact, one of the objects of the
FTC Act was to prevent potential injury by stopping unfair meth-
ods of competition in their incipiency.
The following are rules of limited application which indicate
the reach of the FTC, and which may be helpful as sources in similar
fact situations:
-Once deception occurs, it is no defense that the consumer is fami-
liarized with the true facts before entering an agreement.3
-It is no defense that no damage has occurred to consumers, since
the FTC Act provides a preventive rather than a compensatory
remedy. 4
-Nor is it a defense that the act or practice complained of is a
common one in a particular industry or trade.3"
-A corporation will be held responsible for its employees' acts in
29. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. FTC, supra note 14 at 674, n.1;
Portwood v. FTC, supra note 25 at 420.
30. Charles of the Ritz Distributing Co. v. FTC, supra note 25 at 679-680 (footnotes
omitted).
31. Gellhorn, supra note 28 at 560. The courts are in essence the enforcement arm of
the FTC.
32. Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1966) (citations omitted).
33. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 873; Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6Lh Cir.) cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
35. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, supra note 34 at 182.
[Vol. 37
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violation of § 5 even in the face of precautionary measures against
such illegality." Similarly, a defense based on common law em-
ployee/independent contractor differentiations carries no weight."
-Cessation of illegal practices, and by inference cessation of busi-
ness, will not automatically mean cessation of FTC prosecution.3
-"Puffing", an "expression of opinion not made as a representation
of fact," is not illegal; but goods may not be assigned benefits or
virtues they do not possess. 39
As this partial list of rules demonstrates, the FTC has been
given wide latitude by the courts in achieving its consumer
protection goals. Attorneys involved in either a federal or state ac-
tion pursuant to a § 5 type statute should be aware that this hands-
off attitude exists and that prosecutors possess great discretion
which can result in a marked advantage for them in litigation.
1I1. THE MONTANA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 1973
In 1973 Montana joined the large group of states0 that reacted
to widespread dissatisfaction with the consumer's position by pas-
sage of remedial legislation. The Montana Consumer Protection
Act 4' is very similar to statutes enacted in at least seven states which
stem from recommendations of the Committee on Suggested State
Legislation of the Council of State Governments. 2 It is unquestion-
able that the various aspects of consumer law will become the sub-
ject of expanded controversy and litigation in the future. Although
Montana's Act has not yet been tested in the State's highest court,
there is authority from the FTC and to a limited degree from state
courts 3 to support reasonable inferences about the status of busi-
36. Farke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 753 (1944); see FTC v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1936).
37. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 591-593 (9th Cir. 1957).
38. Id.; see Perma-Maid Co., Inc. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir. 1941).
39. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945). Note that "the testimony
of witnesses drawn from the general public of the impressions made upon their minds upon
reading the advertisements was admissible." Id. at 108. However, no sampling of public
opinion is required, since a finding of deception can be made on the basis of a visual examina-
tion of exhibits. Double Eagle Lubricant, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1966);
Portwood v. FTC, supra note 25.
40. 36 states had enacted some form of consumer protection statute prohibiting decep-
tive acts or practices by March 1, 1972. Lovett, supra note 8 at 724.
41. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 85-401 et seq. [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
42. Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, N. Carolina, S. Carolina, Vermont, and Washing-
ton. Lovett, supra note 8 at 731-732. "Although . . . characterized as a 'little FTC Act'
because of support from that agency, this labeling is really quite misleading. The UTPCPA
is actually much broader and more effective in its remedial provisions. Id. at 730. This
is especially true in Montana, as will be demonstrated below.
43. There is a definite dearth of state case-law authority in the consumer area. Wash-
ington stands out as an exception becausp of the maturity of its enforcement program (now 7
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ness, consumers, and the state under the Act. Montana attorneys
should prepare themselves by at least gaining familiarity with the
existing legislation.
A. Unlawful Conduct
The Montana equivalent to § 5 of the FTC Act states that
"[U]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful.""
As previously noted, the following section, § 85-403, expresses the
clear intent that FTC and federal court interpretations of § 5 be
given "due consideration and weight" in the construction of § 85-
402. 11 To some as yet undetermined extent, therefore, the rules set
out previously are part of Montana's law of consumer protection.
Until court action defining that extent occurs, one can only specu-
late as to which rules apply, and how they apply.
The discretionary rule-making power given to the Department
of Business Regulation" is more definite. Its rules and regulations
can "not be inconsistent" with FTC and court interpretations of
§ 5.47 The Department is thus limited, albeit negatively, where the
federal government has acted." Since the issues faced by state bu-
reaucrats will very rarely be similar to the ones faced at the national
level because of the different interests the two agencies were created
to regulate, this limitation is in essence no limit at all.4"
in existence nearly 15 years), and of course as a function of adequate budgeting and efficient
management. See generally Lovett, supra note 8 at 736; Comment, Toward Effective Con-
sumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to Deceive Test Applied to Private Actions, 10
GONZAGA L. REV. 457, 458 (1975). It is suggested that this nationwide lack of authority is the
result of several factors, including reluctance and fear of officials and private persons to
pursue judicial remedies, lack of adequate funds for such pursuit, bureaucratic red tape, and
questionable ordering of priorities. The same problems seem to plague the FTC.
44. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-402.
45. The text is set out supra at note 17. The "trade regulation rules" noted supra at
note 12 were given substantive effect and thus made applicable at least to some extent, in
Montana by the National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. case, supra note 14. As of Jan. 4, 1975,
FTC rulemaking must follow new guidelines laid down by Congress, although previously
promulgated rules retain their validity. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. IV, 1974).
46. This department was created by R.C.M. 1947, § 82A-401 in 1971 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the department]. It is actually the Consumer Affairs Division of that department
which is responsible for implementing the Act.
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-403(2).
48. Note that national advertising (essentially, run in 5 or more states) is exempt from
the Act. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 85-404(3), 85-401(5).
49. The Consumer Affairs Division of the department has thus far chosen to act only
in two areas: 1) the definition of some of the acts and practices it considers to be "unfair or
deceptive and therefore unlawful..." Montana Administrative Code § 8-2.4(1)-$400
[hereinafter referred to as MAC] (the list is too lengthy to reproduce here but offers some
excellent guidelines as to advertising, false representation, "bait and switch", etc.); 2) re-
8
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The state Act does not apply to "actions or transactions permit-
ted under law administered by the Montana public service commis-
sion", or to acts of merchants, publishers, newspapers, periodicals,
radio, television, or ad agencies when they act without knowledge
of the illegal character of the ads displayed and have no direct
financial interest in the product or service advertised."0 The former
exemption is justified by the high standard of care and close scru-
tiny given to permissible utility action by the PSC; the latter by the
logic and practicality of a policy which confines sanctions to those
merchants who are actually responsible for alleged illegality.5
An act utilizing language very similar to Montana's withstood
challenge on due process grounds in the Washington supreme
court.2 The court held that because of the guidance offered by the
abundance of federal trade law interpreting § 5 of the FTC Act, the
words used have a well-settled meaning and are not unconstitu-
tionally vague. Furthermore, Washington courts will engage in the
same "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,""3 that
the federal courts have utilized in the past. 4
There is no question that it was the Montana legislature's in-
tent in the 1973 Act that federal interpretations supply the founda-
tion for defining "unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices," and that our courts would build on this
foundation, as Washington's have. This grant of power to shape a
unique state consumer jurisprudence perhaps explains the breadth
noted above in the words "due consideration and weight" and "not
. . . inconsistent" of § 85-403; only with wide latitude can the
courts and local administrators adequately meet special consumer
problems.
B. Enforcement Procedures
Procedural aspects of the law will probably be the biggest prob-
lem in fleshing out a Montana definition of unlawful conduct. The
differences between state and federal enforcement mechanisms
presents the most obvious problem. At the federal level, there is an
expert agency empowered and budgeted to make final adjudicatory-
quirements and definitions in the area of motor vehicle repairs and sales (probably Montana's
leading area of consumer business friction). MAC §§ 8-2.4(2)-S410 et seq. The CAD exercises
additional functions under other statutory authority. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, § 18-520, § 75-
9206.
50. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-404(1) and (2).
51. Lovett, supra note 8 at 734.
52. State v. Reader's Digest Association, 81 Wash.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
53. Id. at 301.
54. Reed, Consumer Protection in Washington: An Overview, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 391,
395 (1975).
19761
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type determinations of illegality. The FTC only acts when it has
reason to believe illegality has occurred or when "it shall appear
. . .that a proceeding . . .would be to the interest of the pub-
lic. . ."I The person complained of has the right to appear and
show cause why a cease and desist order should not issue" and also
has the right to judicial review in the circuit courts of appeal.5"
Violation of an FTC cease and desist order can result in civil penal-
ties of up to $10,000 per violation.5"
As in the FTC Act, the Montana Department of Business Regu-
lation may bring an action when it has reason to believe illegality
has occurred or when the proceeding would be in the public inter-
est.59 The similarity of the federal law ends here. Instead of an
administrative show cause hearing and judicial review, Montana's
Act provides for an injunctive action to be brought in the name of
the state in district court.6 The court may issue temporary or per-
manent injunctions to restrain and prevent violations;6 it may fash-
ion a judgment to restore persons harmed to their former status;"
and it may revoke licenses or certificates authorizing persons to do
business in the state if such action would restore to an injured party
money or property lost as a result of the injury. 3
Because of these broad remedial powers, including the ability
to put a person out of business, a court may be reluctant to find a
defendant guilty without substantial proof. How is a Montana dis-
trict court to do the same job that it takes hundreds of people,
thousands of dollars, and often several years to perform in the FTC?
55. 15 U.S.C. 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
56. 15 U.S.C. 45(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
57. 15 U.S.C. 45(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
58. 15 U.S.C. 45(e) (Supp. IV, 1974). There is a special proceeding for recovery of these
fines. 15 U.S.C. 95(m) (Supp. IV, 1974).
59. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-405. Note that the department may also act if it has reason to
believe that a person is "about to knowingly use" an illegal practice. In this sense the
Montana Act is broader than the FTC Act in giving the department power to restrain future
acts done with knowledge of their illegality. However, until Montana establishes what is
unfair or deceptive and makes these guidelines known, there would appear to be a full defense
to prosecution for future acts in lack of knowledge. The section may have limited use for
repeat offenders. If the department wants to restrain future action, its best bet would be to
rely on the language at note 32, supra, and attack at the first sign of overt action on the basis
of the "incipiency" standards.
60. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-405. Note that either the department or the county attorney may
institute and prosecute these actions. If the county attorney chooses to do so, he must notify
and report to the department. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-416.
61. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-405.
62. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-406. In this capacity the court may use the services of a receiver.
R.C.M. 1947, § 85-407 specifies the receivers' rights and duties. The court apparently cannot
order dissolution, suspension or forfeiture of corporate franchise until an injunction is vio-
lated. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-415.
63. R.C.M. 1947. 8 85-406.
10
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One court has held under a similar statute that the procedure is
simply to let the jury decide the facts and have the court determine
as a matter of law whether an act is unfair or deceptive. 4 Attorneys
will have to aid the court in its determination of the law and in the
correct application of the federal rules.
The Washington supreme court has stated that:
When appropriate we will consider the pertinent federal court in-
terpretations of § 5 of the FTC Act. But in each case the question
of what constitutes an "unfair method of competition" or an "un-
fair or deceptive act or practice" . . . is for us, rather than the
federal courts, to determine . . . [W]e may consider all relevant
federal precedent .... 15
The Washington court made its own law in holding that "an act
which is illegal and against public policy is per se unfair within the
meaning of [the Washington code section identical to R.C.M. 1947,
§ 86-402]."66 Because of the vagueness limitations of procedural due
process, however, a court must be wary of completely abandoning
federal law in favor of a new and different state jurisprudence. 7
At a minimum, it should be clear from prior discussion that the
prosecution's burden of proof does not include the necessity of
showing intent or the common law elements of fraud. A "capacity
to deceive" test should be adopted. Unless the court feels it would
be helpful, consumer testimony should not be required. The con-
sumer standard is not what a "reasonable man" would do under
similar circumstances but rather whether an act could deceive the
ignorant, credulous, or unthinking. "Incipient unfairness" should be
within the court's power to control. Other rules noted earlier in this
comment should be considered by the court in fact situations simi-
lar to those in which those rules were promulgated." In unique fact
situations the court should be free to analogize to FTC action; fi-
nally, if no valid analogy can be made, the court should take into
account the determinations made by the Department and its own
traditional notions of equity and fair play.
C. Other Remedies
As a complement to the district court's injunctive power under
§ 85-405, the Montana Act provides that on petition of the Depart-
64. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-7 (1975).
65. State v. Reader's Digest Association, supra note 52 at 301.
66. Id. at 301-302. See also 10 GONZAGA L. REv. 529 (1975) for a development of this
rule.
67. See generally Id. at 300-301; State v. Ralph Williams Northwest Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc., 82 Wash.2d 265, 510 P.2d 233, 242 (1973).
68. See Reed, supra note 54 at 397-400.
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ment violators of an injunction can be assessed a civil penalty of up
to $10,000 per violation. 9 If the court finds that a violation was
committed by one who "knew or should have known that his con-
duct was a violation", the Department may recover an additional
$500 per violation on behalf of the state." Also, the court in its
discretion may fine violators not more than $2000, imprison them
for not more than one year, or do both, but only if the illegal act
constituted a "fraudulent course of conduct."" Finally, on petition
of the Department, the court may order dissolution, suspension, or
forfeiture of the corporate franchise of any violator of an injunc-
tion."
The Department of Business Regulation has two less formal
tools with which to shape business compliance in the face of con-
sumer grievances. First, it may accept assurance of voluntary com-
pliance after its determination of illegality, and thus prevent or
discontinue action it considers violative of the Act without the ne-
cessity of proving anything to anyone.73 Such an assurance must be
in writing and be filed with the district court. It must be approved
by the court; it does not operate as an admission. Secondly, the
Department has broad investigative powers, including the "civil
investigative demand"74 developed by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice for antitrust use,75 and traditional subpoena and investigatory
hearing powers.7" Thus, the Department may obtain access to
documents, records, samples, and witnesses without first filing a
complaint in court. Although authority is not explicit in the statute,
it appears that county attorneys may also utilize these discovery
devices." Enforcement is by means of a judicial hearing, which can
69. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(1).
70. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(2),(4).
71. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(3). The addition of "fraudulent course of conduct" is unex-
plained and undefined. One can only speculate as to its inclusion in this section.
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-415. There is a difference between this power and that noted
supra note 62. The latter is solely to restore injured parties to their former status; the former
is penal.
73. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-409. Because of the low cost of this procedure and its favorable
reception by businessmen at the federal level, this remedy is especially valuable. See discus-
sion, Lovett, supra note 8 at 741-742. For Washington's use of the CID, see Reed, supra note
54 at 406-407; Comment, Washington's Civil Investigative Demand, 10 GONZAGA L. REV. 651
(1975).
74. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-410(1).
75. Lovett, supra note 8 at 737.
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-411. This section also affirms department power to make sub-
stantive rules and regulations granted under R.C.M. 1947, § 85-403(2).
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-416 provides that "the county attorney may institute and
prosecute actions in the same manner as provided for the department (emphasis added)."
This language raises questions of legislative intent which R.C.M. 1947, § 85-417 may help to
clarify. The latter provides that county attorneys in first and speond class counties may
Inu--tLime investigator. By logical extension, an investigator should have available
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result in either an injunction against advertisement or sale of any
merchandise, vacation or suspension of corporate charter, revoca-
tion or suspension of authority or a license to do business in Mon-
tana furthering the alleged violation, or other relief as may be re-
quired."' Disobedience of a court order carries a mandatory con-
tempt citation.79 Procedural safeguards built into these statutes to
protect businessmen from unwarranted harassment include the
right to extend the time of, or modify or set aside an investigative
demand by petition to the district court," the right to freedom from
self-incrimination, and protections from information disclosures by
the Department.'
D. Private Remedies
Montana has what very well may be the broadest private rem-
edy provision of any consumer protection statute in the nation. 2
The Montana statute allows any person, including corporations,
partnerships, and other legal entities,3 to bring an individual (but
not a class) action if that person:
[P]urchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal,
family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertaina-
ble loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the
use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice
declared unlawful [by the Act]. ..
A recovery of $200 or actual damages, whichever is greater, may be
supplemented in the court's discretion by the ability to award up
to three times actual damages and other equitable relief,85 as well
as reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party.86 Injunctions,
judgments, or orders made by a court in a department action to
restrain illegal conduct "shall be prima facie evidence in an action
brought under . ..[this section] . . .that the respondent used or
the investigative tools of the department. The same logic does not apply to the "assurance of
voluntary compliance" of R.C.M. 1947, § 85-409, but that power too should be extended to
counties.
78. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 85-413(1),(2) and (3).
79. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-413(3).
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-410(2).
81. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-411.
82. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-408.
83. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-401(1).
84. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-408(1).
85. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-408(1). What is includable in actual damages is an open question.
See Reed, supra note 54 at 401.
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-408(3). The court's power to award attorney fees to the defending
party may have the effect of keeping otherwise meritorious claims out of court at least until
some case law is established for private actions, but the section may also offer balance to the
statute which is still quite favorable to consumers.
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employed a method, act or practice declared unlawful. . ."I This
remedy is clearly a broad and powerful one for consumers. It carries
forward basic policy:
The proper objective of social policy with such remedial devices
should be to encourage assertion of legitimate consumer rights
without encouraging unwarranted harassment of honest business-
men acting in good faith. From this standpoint, a reliable provision
of attorney's fees and costs of suit for successful consumer plain-
tiffs will almost certainly be the most important factor in enabling
consumer actions, with the lack of compensation to unsuccessful
litigants serving as a needed discipline against unwarranted
claims. Punitive damages, at least up to a certain level of recovery,
serve the valuable function for consumers of offsetting risks of
litigation or problems of proof in determining proper dam-
ages. ..s
Montana's statute does fall short, however, in its making attorney
fees discretionary, since "consumers and their counsel should be
assured of something more than a chance of actual damages . . .
[tihe consumer must be assured that he can actually recover
reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of his suit. . .. "" Per-
haps this deficiency will be offset by judicial liberality in damage
awards, particularly in light of the judges' double discretionary
power to order treble damages and attorney fees.
One final problem in the Montana private remedy provision is
the burden of proof. The plaintiff must show injury of some sort in
money or property; he must show that such injury was proximately
caused by defendant's action; and he must show that this action was
one declared unlawful by the Act. The first two elements are tradi-
tional and should pose no new difficulties. The proof of unlawful
conduct (in the absence of the prima facie evidence of a Department
action) raises serious questions with no known answers. Is the bur-
den of proof the same as that placed on the Department in its
action? Are the FTC tests to be applied here? Plaintiffs can argue
that because of the absence of any different command, and because
of the "prima facie evidence" provision tying public and private
actions together, the answer to both questions should be yes. Defen-
dants can argue that the common law fraud test should apply since
the standard rules of procedure are specifically applicable and any
change would cause a dangerous imbalance in favor of consumers,
who are already offered the protection by the Department. Plain-
87. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-408(4). This section should cut both ways, protecting a respon-
dent who prevailed in a department action.
88. Lovett, supra note 8 at 744-745.
89. Id.
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tiffs' argument appears to carry the most weight and follows the
legislative intent of the Act, but only a court decision can answer
these questions. As yet, utilization of this private remedy provision
has been negligible if not non-existent. Washington has seen a simi-
lar lack of interest in its private remedy statute. 0 The non-use may
be attributable to the high costs of such an action in Washington,'
but such an explanation should carry less weight in this state be-
cause of the types of recovery permitted by our provision. It is more
likely that a general lack of knowledge of this statute on the part of
Montana consumers and their attorneys is responsible for its rare
utilization.
IV. CONCLUSION
Montana has had one of the nation's best consumer protection
acts for nearly three years now, but so far court action pursuant to
it has been rare, leaving consumers uncertain as to what rules the
Act may create or change. Washington's experience shows that in
time, and given proper resources, a consumer jurisprudence will be
created. As case law begins to develop, use of the Act should expand
at a far greater pace than now. Montanans should be aware of this
trend and should recognize the developments as they occur so that
consumer protection will become a reality rather than a lifeless
statute.
90. RCWA § 19.86.090 (1961) (as amended in 1970).
91. Comment, supra note 43 at 457.
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